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We describe three diﬀerent extensive data sets on the Swiss market for basic health care
insurance—a homogeneous product by construction. First, we provide descriptive statistics
on market prices for period 2004 - 2010. Second, we present aggregated data on health plan
choices made by Swiss residents in the same period. Third, we describe and analyze an
extensive survey executed in 2009 which documents health care plan and insurer choices of
enrollees as well as their switching behavior. Price data reveal an increase of the mean price
level and substantial and persistent price level diﬀerences across regions. We also observe a
steady increase of price dispersion; contemporaneously, enrollees face an increasing number
of operating companies. Indeed, we ﬁnd a strong positive relation between regional price dis-
persion, the regional price level and the number of operating companies. Although enrollees
have moved to less expensive health care plans, our aggregate and survey data point to insuf-
ﬁcient price optimization on the part of the enrollees. Aggregate data disclose an increasing
gap between the premia paid by enrollees and the lowest premia available in the respective
submarket. Moreover, Swiss residents could have paid less on average if they had chosen
their insurer randomly. Our Survey data conﬁrm this observation: Despite large potential
monetary gains, only 20% of the enrollees did switch their insurance company by the end of
November 2009. In addition, many enrollees switched to more expensive insurance companies,
thereby incurring negative monetary beneﬁts.
∗University of Zurich, yves.ortiz@gmail.com1 Introduction
The Swiss health care insurance system is a market-oriented system designed to foster price com-
petition among the operating health care insurers. Basic health care insurance is a homogeneous
package with clearly deﬁned coverage and mandatory for every Swiss resident while supplementary
insurance is contracted on voluntary basis. Health care insurers are legally bound by law to ac-
cept any application for basic health care insurance; risk adjustment of premia (prices)1 is allowed
according to clearly deﬁned but rather coarse risk categories. As a consequence, the market for
basic health care insurance can be viewed as a homogeneous good market where adverse selection
plays no role.
In this paper, we describe three diﬀerent data sets which provide a broad overview of the Swiss
market for basic health insurance in the period 2004 - 2010. Our data set is valuable for several
reasons. Due to clean design of this market and the fact that the regulatory framework has re-
mained unchanged during the period covered by our data, empirical analysis of the behavior of
all participating agents proves to be particularly compelling. Further, our data provides detailed
information to answer questions related to various aspects of industrial organization. On the one
hand, our data documents entry and price setting decisions of insurance companies. On the other
hand, it provides detailed information on enrollees’ health plan choices as well as their health care
insurer choices in light of the companies’ actions. And eventually, our data are compiled such that
they can be easily analyzed separately or merged using common statistical software packages.
Our ﬁrst data set comprehends all premia oﬀered by all operating insurance companies in the
period 2004 -2010. The second data contains aggregated information on health plan choices of
around 90% of Swiss residents. The third data set consists of an extensive survey executed in
2009 which documents enrollees’ health care plan and insurer choices as well as their switching
behavior.
From market premia data we see that mean premia have increased in the period under study and
that they diﬀer with respect to the characteristics insurers are allowed to adjust for. In particu-
lar, we observe substantial and persistent diﬀerences in mean premia levels across regions. These
diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerences in marginal costs across regions. We also observe a
steady increase of price dispersion in all submarkets. Interestingly, we register a contemporaneous
increase of the number of operating insurance companies in each region. Indeed, we ﬁnd a strong
positive relation between regional price dispersion, regional price level and the number of operat-
ing companies.
Our second data set allows us to analyze health care plan choices of Swiss residents and to contrast
aggregated transaction prices with oﬀered prices. We observe that enrollees have switched to less
expensive health care plans by choosing less expensive settings (e.g. HMO) or by choosing higher
deductibles. However, we register a deterioration of the distribution of transaction prices from the
enrollees’ point of view: Premia attained by enrollees are increasingly further away from the lowest
premia available in the respective submarket. A reason for this remarkable development might be
insuﬃcient price optimization on the part of the enrollees. Our data suggest, that enrollees would
have paid less on average if they had chosen their insurer randomly once operating insurers pub-
lished their prices at the beginning of every switching period (October - November). Interestingly,
the average distance to the lowest premia is correlated with individual speciﬁc variables (e.g. age)
and market variables (mean price level, price dispersion and number of operating companies).
Survey data at hand provide a deeper insight into the ﬁndings mentioned above. Despite large
potential monetary gains, only 20% of all enrollees switched their current insurer. In addition,
enrollees who decided to switch opted surprisingly often for more expensive insurers and thus,
enrollees incur monetary losses from switching. In short, insuﬃcient price optimization found in
our aggregated data is conﬁrmed by micro level data. Similar to the ﬁndings from our aggregated
data, the distance between the premia paid by enrollees and the lowest premia in the respective
submarket is correlated with individual characteristics and market variables.
1Throughout the entire paper, we will use “premia” and “prices” likewise as equivalent terms depending on the
context.
11.1 Regulatory framework
The overall health care system is regulated by the Federal Government while more speciﬁc char-
acteristics of the system are regulated by the 26 cantons. All Swiss residents (7.7 million in 2008)
are obliged to be enrolled in basic health care. Basic health care is a standardized package with
clearly deﬁned coverage. Insurers are bound by law to accept any applicant for basic health care
if the basic health care plan wished by the applicant is part of the insurer’s portfolio. A basic
health care plan consists of a basic health package combined with a setting and deductible level;
setting and deductible are chosen by the enrollee. The various settings oﬀered by the insurers
do not restrict the coverage of the basic health package but prescribe the set of providers or the
sequence of steps to be undertaken to obtain treatment2.
Insurers are allowed to oﬀer risk adjusted prices based on age group (0-18, 19-25 and > 25) and
region of residence3. The level of oﬀered prices will therefore depend on the setting and deductible
chosen by the enrollee, the region of residence and the age group the enrollee belongs to. Sup-
plementary insurance is not mandatory and subject to usual forces of insurance markets (such as
rejection or premium risk adjustment based on a deliberate amount of individual speciﬁc charac-
teristics) and does not need to be purchased from the insurer providing basic health care plan.
Not all insurers operate in the entire country; moreover, some insurers focus their operations in
selected regions. Insurers have a wide scope in setting their prices, even though prices need to be
justiﬁed by costs. In particular, insurers must submit their prices—valid for the following calendar
year—to the Federal Oﬃce of Public Health Care (FPOH) by the end of August of the preceding
year. After inspection, the FOPH makes all prices public at the beginning of October. Enrollees
have then the opportunity to switch their insurer or to adjust their health care plan until the end
of November. All contracts have a one year duration and remain uncallable during that period4.
2In a HMO-setting, the enrollee must get treatment from HMO-centers cooperating with the insurer. In other
settings, an enrollee must consult his regular doctor (HAM-setting) or a medical call-center (Telmed-setting) for
a ﬁrst diagnosis. In the standard setting, an enrollee faces no restrictions on the set of providers or consultation
procedure, that is, an enrollee is allowed to consult a specialist of his choice without any previous diagnosis.
In general, settings with restricted choice of providers or consultation procedure—but always oﬀering the same
coverage—-are cheaper; the choice of a higher deductible reduces premium as well.
3Switzerland was subdivided into 43 administrative regions in 2004 to standardize risk adjustment by place of
residence.
4There are some clearly deﬁned situations, where enrollees are allowed to switch their provider e.g. if a health
care insurer ceases operations.
22 Premia for Basic Health Care
In this section, we describe an extensive data set containing all prices for basic health insurance
oﬀered by all operating insurance companies in the period 2004 - 2004. We also provide a set
of descriptive statistics to illustrate recent trends in market prices. Further, we investigate the
statistical relation between regional price dispersion, regional mean price level and the number of
operating insurance companies.
2.1 Overview
As mentioned in the previous section, all insurers must hand their oﬀered prices—for all regions
in which they operate, age groups, deductible levels and settings in their portfolio—to the FOPH,
which on its part makes the data available to the public. There is no aggregation in the data, that
is, basic health care insurance prices pl
r,a,s,d,t are available by year (t), insurer (l), administrative
region (r), age category (a), setting (s) and deductible level (d). Our data sample covers the pe-
riod 2004-2010, i.e. t = 2004,2005,...,2010. For notational convenience, let k = {r,a,s,d} denote
the vector of time independent indices such that pl
k,t = pl
r,a,s,d,t stands for the premia oﬀered by
insurer l in sub market k in the year t.
The right panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the mean of oﬀered premia for the oﬃcial age categories (0-18,
19-25 and >25) in the period 2004-2010. Mean premia have increased considerably for age cate-
gories 19-25 and >25 since 2004. A particular sharp increase is registered in the year 2010. As
shown in the appendix, the level of premia varies also across settings and deductible levels. The
left panel of appendix ﬁgure 10 makes clear that the standard and most common setting (“Base”)
is generally the most expensive and the HMO-setting the least costly. The right side panel of the
same ﬁgure shows the distribution of prices for the diﬀerent deductible levels and of course, health
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Figure 1: Distribution of premia (left) and Mean annual premia (right) in 2004-2010
The left panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the distribution of premia in the period 2004-2010 (for age
category >25, in all administrative regions, the most common setting (“Base”) and deductible
level 1). We observe considerable dispersion of oﬀered premia and a continuous increase of the
median. Dispersion comes in trough two channels: As shown in the left panel of ﬁgure 2, there is
price dispersion within every region. In addition, substantial price level diﬀerences across regions
(here: across cantons) prevail and amount to e.g. 123% between Geneva (GE) and Appenzell
Innerrhoden (AI) for age category > 25 in the year 2006. Diﬀerences in the level of oﬀered premia
across regions have remained stable throughout 2004-2010 even though a moderate equlization
has taken place in the years 2009 and 2010. These diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerences
in marginal costs across regions. The right panel of ﬁgure 2 illustrates this fact: We ﬁnd an
3almost perfect linear relation beteween monthly treatment costs per capita and the mean oﬀered
premia in the cantons5. There are many factors which are held responsible for the diﬀerences in
costs across regions and there is an ongoing debate on the number of factors and their impact on
marginal costs. These latter questions lie beyond the scope of this work and therefore, we limit
ourselves to assert that diﬀerences in marginal costs account for a large part of the diﬀerences in
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Monthly treatment costs (adults)
By cantons;  reported for enrollees older than 18 years
Monthly treatment costs per capita vs. mean premia in 2009
Figure 2: Distribution of premia by cantons (age categories 0-18, 19-25, > 25)
2.2 Price dispersion, mean prices and the number of companies
Insurance companies usually focus their operations in selected regions. As a consequence, we
observe substantial diﬀerences in the number of operating insurance companies across regions as
illustrated in the left panel of appendix ﬁgure 11. These diﬀerences have been vanishing since
insurers extended continuously their scope of operation, leading to a higher average number of
operating companies by region (see right panel of appendix ﬁgure 11).
Explorative analysis reveals a strong relation between price dispersion and the mean price level
in a submarket. We also detect a weaker but signiﬁcant positive relation between price dispersion
the number of operating insurance companies in a submarket. To illustrate this observation, we
execute a simple regression. Let us deﬁne pr,t, σr,t and Nr,t as the mean price level, the mean
standard deviation and the mean number of operating companies in region r and year t. Since we
are not interested in the time eﬀects of the price level and number of ﬁrms on price dispersion, we
regress the time average of the regional price dispersion on the time average of the regional price
level and number of operating companies
¯ σr = c + ¯ pr + ¯ Nr + ǫr. (1)
As reported in table 1, our regression results deliver surprisingly clear results. We ﬁnd a strong and
positive relation between regional price dispersion and the price level and a positive and signiﬁcant
relation between regional price dispersion and the number of operating companies. These relations
are illustrated by the partial regression plots in appendix ﬁgure 12. Remarkably, the variables ¯ pr
and ¯ Nr explain 0.814% of the cross-regional variation of the variable ¯ σr.
2.3 Section Summary
The mean of oﬀered market premia has increased in Switzerland in the period 2004-2010, particu-
larly for age the categories 19-25 and > 25 and in the year 2010. Premia diﬀer with respect to the
5First, data refer to mean premia and treatment costs for enrollees older than 18 years. Second, mean premia
are lower than marginal costs in our graph because treatment costs payed out of the pocket by enrollees are not
included the treatment costs reported by insurance companies.
4Number of obs 43
F(2,40) 209.93
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.814
sd Coef. Stde t P>t
Mean Price 0.092 0.005 20.38 0.000
Num of companies 4.653 0.593 7.85 0.000
constant -296.302 38.115 -7.77 0.000
Table 1: Regression results of equation (1)
characteristics that insurers are allowed to adjust for (region of domicile, age category, setting and
deductible level). We observe substantial and persistent diﬀerences in price levels across regions.
These diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerences in marginal costs across regions. Regional price
dispersion is positively correlated with regional price level and the number of operating insurance
companies.
53 Health Care Plan Choices (SASIS-Data)
A large data set provided by Datenpool Santesuisse, a service provider of the Swiss health care
insurer association Santesuisse (SASIS), allows us to examine basic health care plan choices of Swiss
residents for the period 2004-2009. Not all health insurers are members of SASIS, nevertheless
our data covers about 91% of all Swiss residents. Datenpool Santesuisse does not publish any
data at individual level, neither at enrollee level nor at insurer level and thus, no insurer must fear
competitive disadvantage from supplying data to Datapool Santesuisse. Although we are not able
to execute formal tests, it is hard to imagine that non-membership of insurers could be correlated
with characteristics of their enrollees. Therefore, we regard our data set as a highly representative
data sample on Swiss residents’ basic health care plan choices. Table 2 reports the coverage of our
data sample for each age category (covg), the share of the respective age category in the entire
population (shpop) and in our data sample (shsmpl). The SASIS-data document the number of
Table 2: Sample Statistics: SASIS-Data
For all regions, settings and deductible levels
Oﬃcial age category
Year 0-18 19-25 >25
In % covg. shpop shsmpl covg. shpop shsmpl covg. shpop shsmpl
2004 90% 21% 21% 95% 8% 9% 92% 71% 71%
2005 90% 21% 20% 94% 8% 9% 91% 71% 71%
2006 91% 21% 20% 95% 8% 9% 92% 71% 71%
2007 90% 20% 20% 93% 8% 9% 91% 71% 71%
2008 90% 20% 20% 93% 8% 9% 91% 71% 72%
2009 88% 20% 19% 93% 9% 9% 90% 72% 72%
2010 89% 19% 19% 92% 9% 9% 88% 73% 72%
Source: Datenpool Santesuisse, FSO (Population Data)
covg: coverage w.r.t population
shpop: share of age category in population
shpop: share of age category in sample
enrollees nk,t and the aggregated amount Pk,t paid by those nk,t enrollees who have chosen a
certain setting s and deductible level d in the year t while belonging to age category a and having
domicile of residence in region r. These data comprehend all regions, age categories, settings and
















The average price can be easily calculated for any desired aggregation level by means of wk,t and
pk,t. Figure 3, shows the distribution of basic health care choices by settings (left) and deductible
levels (right). Figure 4 shows the evolution of the average price pt for all enrollees (left) and by age
category (right)—aggregation over deductible levels and regions takes place using the appropriate
weights.
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Figure 3: Health care plan choices: Settings (left) and deductible levels (right)
Other) has increased as well as those choosing the highest deductible level. Despite of this cost
dampening reallocation, average premia paid by enrollees of the age categories 19-25 and >25 have
increased continuously in the period 2004-2010; a particular sharp increase is registered in the year
2010. A comparison of the average premia paid by enrollees and the mean of oﬀered premia reveals
a close comovement between these to variables. Moreover, the mean of oﬀered premia for the next
period (prices are published at the beginning of October of the precedent year) is an excellent
predictor for the average premia that enrollees will pay in that period.
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For all age categories, regions, settings and deductible levels




















































By year and age category | For all regions, settings and deductible levels





Figure 4: Average premia paid: For all enrollees (left) and by age category (right)
3.1 Section Summary
Enrollees have switched from the standard, most expensive setting to alternative, less expensive
settings. The choice of deductible levels has remained fairly stable except for the continuous shift
to the highest deductible level (deductible level 6). Paid average premia are highly correlated with
the mean of oﬀered market premia.
74 Merging the SASIS Data with the Market Premia
Merging the market premia with the SASIS-data allows us to provide a set of valuable descriptive
statistics. First, we are able to provide measures of dispersion at any aggregation level. Second,
we are able to contrast oﬀered marked prices with transaction prices.
4.1 Measures of dispersion
Measures of price dispersion are commonly used to assess and compare the degree of competitive-
ness in markets with nearly homogeneous goods (see Baye et al. (2006)). Following these lines, we
present the most common measures of price dispersion for the basic health care insurance market
in Switzerland.
As exposed earlier in section 3, we have at our disposal extensive data on transaction prices and
utilization of basic health care plans. In order to provide sensible measures of dispersion at dif-
ferent aggregate levels, we opt to include information on the number of enrollees in a certain
submarket k. The idea behind this slight modiﬁcation is the following: Dispersion in a certain
submarket k might be large but irrelevant if submarket k is composed by few enrollees and thus,





k,t} as the vector of prices oﬀered by the Nk insurers operating in submarket





where dk,t stands for one of the following measures of dispersion in submarket k and year t:
standard deviation (σk,t), coeﬃcient of variance (cv = σk,t/¯ pk,t), range (range = maxl PN
k,t. −
minl PN
k,t) and the value of information (V OI = ¯ pk,t − minl PN
k,t). Our measure of dispersion has
several intuitive and desirable properties which allow a suitable assessment of dispersion across
submarkets and across time. First, if two markets have identical values of d, then the market with
larger number of enrollees enters in md with a larger weight. Second, if for example wk,t = wk,t+1
for all k ∈ ¯ k, then our measure of dispersion increases only if dispersion increases in at least one
submarket k.
Table 3: Measures of Dispersion 2004 - 2009
For all regions, age categories, settings and deductible levels
mσ mcv mrange mV OI ¯ N
2004 198 0.086 1052 344 54.3
2005 226 0.099 1196 378 53.8
2006 234 0.101 1317 399 58.6
2007 244 0.106 1368 439 59.3
2008 243 0.107 1308 441 61.6
2009 246 0.107 1341 461 64.7
2010 266 0.108 1391 519 65.9
Sources: Datenpool Santesuisse, FOPH
Table 3 reports these weighted measures of dispersion for the entire market together with the
respective average number of operating insurers, ¯ N. Tables 7-9 in appendix C report the same
measures aggregated by age category, setting and language region, respectively and conﬁrm the
observed continuous increase of price dispersion at any aggregation level. In addition, appendix
table 7 reports systematically lower coeﬃcients of variance for higher age categories. This observa-
tion is consistent with reported evidence (see Pratt et al. (1979)) in that markets of higher priced
goods display larger standard deviations and smaller coeﬃcients of variance than low priced goods.
Table 7 reveals another interesting aspect in the evolution of price dispersion: we see how young
8markets, represented by the alternative settings (HAM, HMO, Other)6 are served by an increasing
number of ﬁrms and how, along with this market deepening, dispersion sharply increases.
4.2 Hypothetical prices
We gain additional valuable insights by comparing a set of hypothetical price levels7. In principle,
enrollees are free to switch to the insurer oﬀering the lowest or highest price, or just to choose
their insurer randomly. Thus, we deﬁne the minimum choice price as the average price paid by
enrollees if they hypothetically switched—while sticking to their chosen health care plans—to the































Note that the mean choice price can be interpreted as if enrollees had chosen their insurer randomly,
since the number of people in every submarket k is large enough to guarantee convergence to the
mean price. Figure 5 contrasts the hypothetical average prices with the actual average price.












































2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Minimum
Maximum Mean
*Average price (actual, min, max, mean) while keeping enrollees’ health care plan choices fixed
By year | For all regions, age categories, settings and deductible levels
Average premia from actual, minimum, maximum and mean choice*
Figure 5:
6These new alternative settings were introduced gradually by insurance companies after 1999 and became more
popular among enrollees after 2002.
7These prices can be interpreted alternatively as weighted average prices, where the weights are given by wk,t,
that is, by the number of enrollees in each submarket.
9Following the lines exposed above, we deﬁne the average premia from the q-quantile choice as
the average price paid by enrollees if they hypothetically switched—while sticking to their chosen









Figure 6 shows p
q
t with q = 0.1,q = 0.2,...,q = 0.9 and illustrates how—keeping the enrollees
health care plan choices ﬁxed—market prices diverge. A similar pattern was already observed




















































2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Quantiles of every submarket are weighted according to market size (number of enrollees)
Average premia from quantile choice (q10, q20,..., q90)
Figure 6:
4.3 Average distance to the lowest price
Let us assume a homogeneous good market with search frictions. In such a market, consumer







that is, the diﬀerence between the price a consumer (enrollee) attains after searching and the




































The right hand side of the last equation can be easily computed once we merge the SASIS-data
(which contain wk,t and pk,t) with the FOPH premia data (which contain minl PN
k,t). We can
10interpret ∆t as a proxy for the average consumer surplus loss in a homogeneous good market with
frictions. These frictions may stand for either search costs or switching costs or both (see Wilson
(2010)). Alternatively and less theory-driven, we can regard ∆t just as the average distance of the
premia attained by enrollees to the lowest premia available in their submarkets.
The left panel of ﬁgure 7 shows how ∆t evolved in the period 2004 - 2010: The premia attained
by enrollees in our sample (90% of all enrollees) are located increasingly further away from the
lowest premia in their submarket. This fact remains still valid if we consider the relative distance,
δl
k,t(i)/pk,t. Further, we ﬁnd that the average distance to the lowest premia is correlated with
individual characteristics (e.g. age) and market variables (e.g. the mean price level, price dis-
persion and the number of operating insurance companies). Appendix ﬁgure 13 illustrates some
of the afore mentioned relations; a more in depth analysis and interpretation of these relations is
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By category age category and year | For all regions settings deductible levels





Figure 7: Distribution of premia by years (left) and age categories (right)
4.4 Section summary and interpretation
Enrollees face increasing price dispersion in the period 2004-2010; this observation is invariant with
respect to the underlying measure of dispersion. In the same period, enrollees face an increasing
number of operating insurance companies. In particular, we observe how young markets are served
by an increasing number of ﬁrms and how, along with this market deepening, dispersion sharply
increases. This observation conﬁrms our previous ﬁndings, in which regional price dispersion is
found to be positively correlated with the number of operating companies.
Transaction premia on the other hand, are increasingly further away from the lowest premia in
their submarket; this observation remains valid even if we consider the relative distance; that is,
the average distance to the lowest premia has increased faster than the mean premia level. We also
ﬁnd the distance to the lowest premia to be correlated with individual speciﬁc variables (e.g. age)
and market market variables (mean price level, price dispersion, number of operating insurance
companies).
Contrasting enrollees’ choices with oﬀered market premia leads to an interesting observation:
Enrollees could have paid less in average if they had chosen their insurer randomly once operating
insurance companies published their prices at the beginning of every switching period. This latter
observation is particularly interesting in the light of theoretical considerations. Consumer search
models imply that the distributions of transaction prices G(p) and oﬀered prices F(p) must be
such that E[G(p)] < E[F(p)] if there is equilibrium price dispersion.8 In our sample, which
comprehends 90% of all enrollees, population estimates are such that ˆ E[G(p)] > ˆ E[F(p)].
8The intuition for this result can be formulated as follows: If some people acquire at least two price quotes while
the remaining part of the consumers do not search (non-searchers are assumed to pick a price randomly), then in
expectation, transaction prices will be lower as if all people had randomized.
115 Survey on basic health care choice and switching behavior
The survey at hand documents basic health care plan and insurer choices as well as switching
behavior of Swiss residents. It was conducted by GFK, Switzerland’s largest market research
institute, on behalf of Comparis.ch just after expiration of the oﬃcial deadline for switching at
beginning of December 2009. This survey represents the most important data source for our work
and consequently, we will describe our data sample in great detail.
6000 individuals between 18 and 75 years were contacted randomly all over Switzerland out of
which 4441 did participate in the computer-assisted telephone interview by answering at least
whether they switched their health care insurer for the next year (i.e. 2010). For ﬁnancial rea-
sons, the survey was conducted in a unorthodox way. The ﬁrst 3000 interviews ended as soon
as the respondent gave a negative answer to the (ﬁrst) question whether she switched her health
care insurer for the next year. No further data were collected. If the respondents gave an aﬃr-
mative answer, then they were asked, among others, about setting and deductible level of their
basic health care plan; in addition, some other individual attributes were collected: gender, age,
domicile, education and income. They were also asked about the way they acquired information
on available basic health care plans and prices. In the remaining 3000 interviews, the additional
information on the respondents was collected regardless of their switching behavior. A detailed
description of the interview process is given by ﬁgures 17 and 18 in appendix D.
5.1 Simple working sample
We now describe how we constructed our working sample and how we corrected for potential sample
bias induced by the survey design and non-participation. We ﬁrst excluded those respondents
who did not provide any information on either setting or deductible choice in their current basic
health care plan: we are left with 1590 observations, henceforth called Sample 1. Information
on current and future insurer, setting, deductible level, age and place of residence (i.e. knowing
l,k,t) is particularly important since it allows us to assign one to one the premia pl
k,t paid by
every enrollee i in the years 2009 and 2010 by matching the survey data with our market premia
data base. This matching procedure returns a unique value, pl
k,t(i), only if information on l,k,t
is complete, which applies to the mentioned 1590 respondents of Sample 1.
5.2 Extended working sample
In some cases, respondents gave no information on their current or future setting (because they
simply did not know their setting), especially if they had no intention to switch their current
insurer. This observation appears plausible: respondents who did not consider switching did
barely deal with the speciﬁc characteristics of their current health care plan (i.e. premia, setting,
deductible level) and thus, they are probably less aware of their own setting. By excluding these
observations, we lose a disproportionately high number of answers from respondents who did not
consider switching which might represent a serious biased loss of information. We opted therefore
to supplement missing information on the choice of setting by using market information and
random sampling.
We now describe how we supplemented the missing setting (724 observations) in the consumer’s
health care plan. In about 15% of all 724 cases, we were able to assign a unique setting to the
enrolles, since the respective insurance company oﬀered just one setting in the enrollee’s submarket.
In all other cases, we resorted to random sampling. As described in section 3, the SASIS-data
document the number of enrollees nk,t who have chosen a certain setting s and deductible level
d in the year t while belonging to age category a and having domicile of residence in region r.
Based on this information, we are able construct the empirical conditional distribution P(s|r,a,d).
We draw the enrollee’s setting randomly from this distribution, since we know her domicile, age
and chosen deductible level. Given the quality of the SASIS-data, we must assume that random
sampling is based on a sample that comes very close to the entire population. This favorable
12feature, of course, does not discard the possibility that some draws do not correspond to the
enrollee’s true setting. We explore therefore the consequences of a wrong setting in the enrollee’s
health care plan. First, insurance companies operate rather simple price schedules and set their
prices in about the following way: pl(HMA)≈ 0.8pl(Standard) and pl(HMO)≈ 0.9pl(HAM). Thus,
wrongly assuming the HMO setting instead of the HAM setting has almost no eﬀect on pk,t(i).
Problems can arise by confounding the Standard setting (Base). The fact that our estimates in
Ortiz (2011) as well as sample statistics remain stable for any deliberate random sample 2 shows
that this problem is rather small, too. Table 4 gives an overview of the survey sample statistics and
contrasts Sample 1 and Sample 2 with corresponding up to date population statistics (column
Pop). We observe that the share of enrollees who intended to switch is almost twice as large
as in the reference sample which composed by the 4441 valid answers. This discrepancy just
reﬂects overrepresentation introduced by the survey design. On the other hand, sample shares
of female respondents, respondents with higher education as well as the regional distribution and
average age are quite consistent with the reference population statistics. The share of respondents
choosing a high deductible and an alternative setting (i.e. HAM, HMO and Other) is higher while
the average premia paid as well as the average distance to the lowest premia are lower than in
the reference sample. We see two possible reasons for the latter discrepancies. First, we expect
“switchers”—overrepresented in this sample—to be more price sensitive and thus, to adjust to
cheaper basic health care plans (i.e. alternative settings and higher deductible levels). Second,
there might be slight self-selection in that less price sensitive enrollees desisted to participate in
the interview.
Table 4: Survey Sample Statistics
Year 2009 (2010) Sample 1 Sample 2 Pop
Num. of observations 1590 2314
Female 49.2% 49.7% 51.3%1
Age, mean 44.1 44.4 43.92a
Education
- higher education 28.5% 29.3% 33.1%2b
Household income, Hinc in CHF
- Hinc ≤ 4500 13.1% 13.6%
- 4501 < Hinc ≤ 9000 59.7% 60.3%
- 9000 > Hinc 27.1% 26.2%
Language region
- German 65.9% 71.2% 67.5%2a
- French 29.9% 25.1% 28.3%
- Italian 4.2% 3.7% 4.3%
Setting
- Base 58.9% (53.2%) 61.9% (56.9%) 69.4% (56.0%)3
- HAM 32.5% (37.9%) 30.5% (35.1%) 25.4% (31.7%)
- HMO 2.6% (2.6% ) 2.6% (2.5%) 3.5% (5.0%)
- Other 6.0% (6.3% ) 5.0% (5.5%) 1.7% (7.3%)
Deductible level
- 1 32.5% (32.5%) 34.2% (33.9%) 45.7% (46.4%)3
- 2,3,4,5 50.0% (50.6%) 49.4% (50.1%) 43.8% (42.5%)
- 6 17.5% (17.0%) 16.4% (16.0%) 10.4% (11.0%)
Average premia in CHF 2782 (3027) 2775 (3035) 2836 (3108)3
Avg. distance to min in CHF 399 (455) 415 (483) 497 (591)3
Intended to switch 45.0% 42.7% 25.0%4
Did switch 37.2% 35.1% 20.6%4
Did search (online) 45.0% (20.6%) 42.7% (17.5%) 25.0% (10.3%)4
Sources:
1: FOPH, yearly Statistics on basic health care, 2009
2a: FSO, population statistics, 2008
2b: FSO, statistics on acquired education diploma, 2009
3: Datenpool Santesuisse
4: Entire survey sample (4441 valid answers)
135.3 Beneﬁts from switching
Our survey data allow us to compute the monetary beneﬁts made by an enrollees once they
switched. Let us deﬁne k′ as the submarket and l′ the insurance company chosen by the enrollee





that is, the diﬀerence between the premia she attained in the year 2010 at the new insurance
company l′ in the submarket k′ and the premia she would have attained if stayed with her for-
mer company l in the new submarket k′. The left panel of ﬁgure 8 shows the distribution of the
switching beneﬁts: The mean of the distribution is slightly positive and we register a considerable
mass of negative values.
Further, we contrast the maximum available switching beneﬁts with realized beneﬁts. The maxi-
mum available beneﬁts are computed as
¯ bk′,2010 = pl
k′,2010 − minPN
k′,2010,
that is, as the diﬀerence between the premia an enrollee would have attained if stayed with her
former company l in the new submarket k′ and the lowest premia available in the new submarket k′.
If we depart from the assumption of a homogeneous market with no frictions and utility maximizing
agents, then no observations should lie below the zero line (see Wilson and Waddams Price (2010)).
Interestingly, Wilson and Waddams Price (2010) report a very similar result (see appendix ﬁgure
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Figure 8:
In addition, we report in appendix ﬁgure 15 the distribution of the enrollees’ distance to the the
lowest premia, δl
k,t(i), in the years 2009 and 2010. Appendix ﬁgure 16 conﬁrms previous ﬁndings
in that the distance to the lowest premia is correlated with individual characteristics and market
variables.
5.4 Section Summary
Our survey provides a quite complete picture of basic health care plan choices and switching be-
haviour in Switzerland in the period 2009 and 2010. About 83% of the respondents who considered
switching did switch eventually. About 40% of those respondents who considered switching con-
sulted one the available online comparison sites to obtain price information. Enrollees switched
very often to insurance companies oﬀering more expensive premia, thereby incurring negative
monetary beneﬁts. This latter observation is hard to conciliate with a homogenous good market
(given optimizing agents) or with optimizing agents (given a homogenous good market).
146 Conclusions
We provided a detailed description of a comprehensive data set on prices and health care plan
choices in the Swiss basic health insurance market for the period 2004 - 2010. During the period
under study, enrollees face increasing price dispersion as well as a growing number of operating
insurance companies oﬀering basic health care insurance in their regions of domicile. Further, we
found a positive relation between regional price dispersion and the number of operating insurance
companies.
Enrollees confront increasing price level by choosing less expensive alternative settings and higher
deductible levels. Nevertheless, premia attained by the enrollees are increasingly further away
from the lowest premia available in the respective submarket. Our aggregate and micro level data
suggest insuﬃcient price optimization on the part of the enrollees.
It seems plausible to conjecture, that insuﬃcient price optimization on the part of the enrollees
may have fostered every of the reported trends: New entry of insurance companies, increasing price
dispersion and increasing distance between transaction premia and the lowest premia. Establishing
this causality and the reasons for the evident insuﬃcient price optimization on the part of the
enrollees is subject of our future research.
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Figure 10: Distribution of premia by settings (left) and deductible levels (right)
17Variable Description Domain
Insurer ID Each insurer has an unique ID number. This ID numbers
are determined and administered by the FPOH.
Integer numbers
between 8 and 1577
Year (t) Corresponding year of the data 2004-2010
Languange region Cantons are part of certain language region according to




Canton Cantons are identiﬁed with their oﬃcial abbrevation code
FPOH region (r) Adminstritative regions are identiﬁed using the oﬃcial
FPOH notation. Example: GE 0. This region compasses
the canton of Geneva. The canton of Zurich is subdivided
in three administrative regions (ZH 1, ZH 2, ZH 3)
Age category (˜ a) Detailed age categories
FPOH age category (a) The three oﬃcial age categories for which the insurers are
allowed to diﬀerentiate the price of oﬀered premia.
0 (0 - 18 years)
19 (19 - 25 years)
26 (age > 25 years)
Setting (s) The three most common settings are identiﬁed using the






Deductible level (d) Oﬀered premia diﬀer w.r.t. the chosen level of deductible
in the health care plan. The number of available deductible
levels and the corresponding deductible amout in CHF vary
by age category and year.
1,2,3,4,5,6
Deductible amout Gives the maximum amout in CHF that an enrollee has to
pay out of the pocket per year given her chosen deductible
level and the age category she belongs to.
Premia pl
k,t Monthly price of the premia oﬀered by insurance company l
gives the FPOH region r, age categoy a, the chosen setting
s and deductible level d.
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Partial Regression: Standard Deviation vs. Num of Ins Companies
Figure 12: Partial regression: Stedv vs. mean price (left) and number of companies (right)
19B Health Care Plan Choices in Switzerland
Variable Description Domain
Year (t) Corresponding year of the data 2004 - 2010
Languange region Cantons are part of certain language region according to




Canton Cantons are identiﬁed with their oﬃcial abbrevation code.
FPOH region (r) Adminstritative regions are identiﬁed using the oﬃcial
FPOH notation. Example: GE 0. This region compasses
the canton of Geneva. The canton of Zurich is subdivided
in three administrative regions (ZH 1, ZH 2, ZH 3).
Age category (˜ a) Detailed age categories
FPOH age category (a) The three oﬃcial age categories for which the insurers are
allowed to diﬀerentiate the price of oﬀered premia.
0 (0 - 18 years)
19 (19 - 25 years)
26 (age > 25 years)
Setting (s) The three most common settings are identiﬁed using the






Deductible level (d) Deductible in the health care plan. The number of available
deductible levels and the corresponding deductible amout
in CHF of vary by age category and year.
1,2,3,4,5,6
Number enrollees (nk,t) Number of enrollees given the FPOH region, age category,
the chosen setting and deductible level in the year t
Gross premia (Pk,t) Total amount payed by the nk enrollees given the FPOH
region r, age category ˜ a or a, the chosen setting s and
deductible level l in the year t
Table 6: Decription of the variables in the SASIS-Data set
20C Merging the SASIS-Data with Market Premia
Table 7: Measures of dispersion by age categories
For all regions, settings and deductible levels
mσ mcv mrange mV OI ¯ N
0-18
Year
2004 73 0.096 366 141 54.2
2005 103 0.129 552 188 53.7
2006 106 0.133 667 220 58.5
2007 124 0.158 773 293 59.2
2008 117 0.156 568 265 61.4
2009 116 0.155 554 259 64.6
2010 134 0.167 659 267 65.8
19-25
Year
2004 222 0.098 1060 394 54.3
2005 273 0.115 1385 529 53.8
2006 304 0.123 1501 526 58.5
2007 300 0.119 1512 509 59.3
2008 282 0.114 1420 491 61.5
2009 292 0.116 1446 548 64.6
2010 302 0.109 1483 614 65.8
¿25
Year
2004 232 0.081 1251 397 54.3
2005 256 0.088 1359 414 53.8
2006 262 0.089 1480 435 58.6
2007 272 0.090 1518 471 59.4
2008 273 0.092 1499 484 61.6
2009 276 0.093 1542 505 64.8
2010 297 0.092 1572 574 66.0
Sources: Datenpool Santesuisse, FOPH
21Table 8: Measures of dispersion by setting
For all regions, age categories and deductible levels
mσ mcv mrange mV OI ¯ N
Base
Year
2004 205 0.087 1121 362 53.4
2005 236 0.102 1282 398 52.9
2006 246 0.103 1430 420 57.6
2007 259 0.110 1496 462 58.4
2008 260 0.109 1462 474 60.6
2009 266 0.110 1515 481 64.1
2010 288 0.107 1595 532 65.3
HAM
Year
2004 128 0.069 391 165 7.0
2005 141 0.075 474 210 9.4
2006 161 0.086 638 287 17.8
2007 172 0.090 776 342 30.9
2008 188 0.100 872 356 36.2
2009 202 0.102 986 439 42.4
2010 243 0.111 1189 539 43.3
HMO
Year
2004 145 0.068 390 189 2.7
2005 135 0.062 386 177 3.0
2006 143 0.072 469 189 6.0
2007 196 0.094 613 256 7.6
2008 222 0.107 724 277 8.7
2009 206 0.100 801 296 17.8
2010 214 0.100 853 342 19.1
Other
Year
2004 0 0.000 0 0 1.0
2005 131 0.048 201 98 2.2
2006 183 0.063 512 267 6.2
2007 193 0.073 753 274 23.3
2008 194 0.093 789 325 26.7
2009 203 0.100 889 355 36.1
2010 242 0.105 1110 457 39.5
Sources: Datenpool Santesuisse, FOPH
22Table 9: Measures of dispersion by language regions
For all age categories, settings and deductible levels
mσ mcv mrange mV OI ¯ N
de
Year
2004 178 0.083 923 285 55.7
2005 213 0.100 1144 347 55.3
2006 227 0.104 1323 371 60.3
2007 243 0.111 1426 419 61.3
2008 242 0.112 1372 426 63.5
2009 248 0.113 1412 444 66.7
2010 264 0.111 1389 487 68.1
fr
Year
2004 266 0.096 1485 513 51.4
2005 268 0.098 1408 473 50.0
2006 258 0.095 1354 489 54.3
2007 252 0.096 1239 507 54.2
2008 246 0.096 1148 492 56.5
2009 239 0.093 1156 516 59.7
2010 262 0.097 1335 605 60.3
it
Year
2004 184 0.068 933 442 45.0
2005 226 0.084 934 389 48.0
2006 219 0.079 1015 399 53.0
2007 233 0.085 1080 410 54.0
2008 244 0.090 1083 436 56.0
2009 245 0.090 1129 458 58.0
2010 332 0.112 1723 609 59.0
Sources: Datenpool Santesuisse, FOPH
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Figure 13: Distribution of premia by years (age categories 0-18, 19-25, > 25)
24D Survey on Basic Health Care Choice
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Figure 15: Distribution: Distance to the minimum price
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By deductible level
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Figure 16: Distribution of premia by years (age categories 0-18, 19-25, > 25)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18: Standard interview (3000 Interviews)
28